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Professor of Finance, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada

1

Introduction

Over time, the interpretation of science has occasionally been corrupted by
vested interest groups, be they financially motivated or ego driven. Scientific
consensus and widespread public beliefs usually catch up with the evidence,
but this can take a very long time and often costs lives. The use of non-human
animals in biomedical research and testing is a scientific endeavor and, as such,
can and should be evaluated in light of the best science currently available.
But facts that have been accepted in all areas of science are routinely ignored
or called into question by well-funded, vested interest groups, compromising
the scientific integrity of biomedical research. History is replete with examples
of practices deemed scientifically viable in one era, but later abandoned as
more facts about the material universe were discovered. There are also many
instances of practices being rejected by the scientific establishment, in spite
of the fact that they were valid based on scientific criteria. In this chapter, we
discuss why science is important in the context of animal modeling, how sci
entific positions are currently evaluated through the peer-review process, and
how an evaluation of the science of animal modeling should be conducted
now. We reach the conclusion that, in order to formally evaluate the scientific
viability of animal modeling, a debate is urgently needed with experts in the
relevant fields of science reviewing pro and con arguments written in position
papers.
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2

Context

The use of non-human animals in science, in general, and in biomedical re
search and testing, in particular, has historically been controversial. Formal
objections to the practice emerged as early as the seventeenth century, primar
ily based on moral objections (Franco, 2013). The peak controversy, perhaps,
began with the popularization of the animal rights movement, circa 1975. Wel
fare concerns aside, there are many stakeholders with vested interests in the
continued use of non-human animals in research. First, many scientists and
nonscientists worldwide are employed, either directly or indirectly, due to the
use of non-human animals in biomedical science, with jobs spanning both
private-sector and publicly-funded entities. The volume and variety of entities
that conduct and/or fund animal-based research complicates any attempt to
quantify the dollar magnitude of associated expenditures; but a conservative
estimate indicates that at least us$10 billion is spent annually on animal-based
research and testing in the United States, only taking account of funds originat
ing from the National Institutes of Health (Monastersky, 2008). If one consid
ers other grant-funding sources and private-sector sources, both in the us and
in the many other countries where non-human animals are used, the amount
spent annually is likely many orders of magnitude more than this conservative
figure.
Of course, human nature is such that people generally oppose technological
changes which may render their own employment obsolete or may otherwise
interfere with their personal objectives. Furthermore, people may even be re
luctant to embrace technological change that simply alters the specific tasks
they undertake in completing their work. For instance, scholarly researchers
who have entire laboratories devoted to animal modeling may be reluctant to
consider adopting non-animal-based research methods if doing so might re
quire the development of new tools, jeopardizing their publishing prospects
or their ability to continue training graduate students to emulate the type
of research they have always undertaken. That is, it takes time and effort for
people to develop new skills, and people are naturally averse to changes that
might require that they do so. Additionally, universities and other research in
stitutions rely on research grant overhead fees as a form of revenue to help
cover the administrative costs of running their organizations. When a sizeable
portion of that overhead-fee revenue stream originates from grants that fund
animal-based research, executives and even employees at those institutions
may be reluctant to consider a future free of animal modeling. A researcher at
Columbia University wrote that one reason animal modeling continues is due
to the "frailties of human nature. Too many eminent laboratories and illustri
ous researchers have devoted too much of their time to studying malignant
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diseases in mouse models, and they're the ones reviewing one another's grants
and deciding where the NIH [National Institutes of Health] money gets spent.
They're not prepared to concede that mouse models are basically valueless for
most cancer therapeutics" (Raza, 2015, p. 232 ).
In recognition that a wide variety of conflicts of interest can influence
scholarly researchers, including non-monetary, Nature Research journals, for
example, require authors "to declare any competing financial and/or non
financial interests," including "present or anticipated employment by any or
ganization that may gain or lose financially through this publication"; unpaid
memberships or advisory positions; writing or consulting for an educational
company; and other considerations (see Nature Research, 2011). Because of
vested interests-whether monetary, emotional, or philosophical-the out
come of any change in the animal-model paradigm has the potential to affect
many people adversely, some of whom are represented by societies, lobby
ists, nonprofits, nongovernmental organizations, and other groups that may
be keen to attract media attention to promote their agendas. Consequently,
vested interests can interfere with the adoption of progressive policies and
behaviors.
The social and political atmosphere surrounding animal use is similar to that
of other science-based controversies (or in some cases, pseudo-controversies),
such as vaccines, global warming, and genetically modified organisms (GM o s).
There are typically advocates on both sides of such issues, and it is often the
case that one needs an advanced science background to understand the rel
evant issues. Thus, the general public, and even some scientists, may not be
able to determine rightly which side the scientific facts actually support. The
more money at stake in any given debate (e.g., the interests of the oil and
coal industries in the context of the global warming controversy), the more
propaganda will likely emerge, potentially confounding the public's ability to
understand and evaluate the facts. Even when there is scientific consensus
because of overwhelming evidence-as there is on the overall effectiveness
of vaccines, the safety of GM o s in terms of human health, and the existence of
global warming-the opposition can be so well funded and prone to promot
ing unscientific points of view that the general public can almost be forgiven
for incorrectly believing there exists real controversy on these points.
Regarding the use of non-human animals to model human responses to
drugs and diseases, articles questioning the scientific viability of the practice
began appearing in the scientific literature in the 1980s. These critiques have
taken various forms and, unfortunately, have included arguments that appear
on the surface to be science-based, but are in fact not valid science-based at
tacks. The first four of the following five points list the most common themes
of these attacks, and we provide a brief explanation of why each argument
Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
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lacks merit. The fifth point represents a valid objection to animal modeling, by
which we mean the objection is logical and is based on scientific facts. In the
discussion that follows, we make frequent reference to the concept of predic
tive value. We refer the reader to the empirical evidence section of Chapter 17
(in this volume), for a detailed discussion of the mathematical calculation of
numerical predictive value. Briefly, predictive value is an important metric by
which a test or methodology correctly identifies an outcome or condition in
humans. The specific threshold by which a particular modality is deemed to
have an acceptably high predictive value varies by context. In medicine, where
lives lie in the balance, one could argue that nothing short of 100% is accept
able. In some cases, even drugs tested with modalities that offer predictive val
ue as high as 99.9% have been pulled from the market due to life-threatening
consequences. In practice, animal models have predictive value below 50%,
making them less informative than a coin flip and rendering them of no practi
cal use in predicting human outcomes. Given the poor predictive value of ani
mal modeling, Kramer and Greek ( 2019) propose existing drug development
and disease research resources ought to be redirected towards personalized
medicine, a new field which offers the promise of 100% predictive value due to
its basis in each patient's own unique genetic makeup.
We now tum to listing the most common critiques of the use of non-human
animals to model human responses to drugs.
1.
The methodology of the experiment was poor, and, therefore, animal model
ing should be abolished This argument is invalid because implicit within
the argument is the false premise that if the methodology had been good
then that would have reflected well on the viability of the entire para
digm of animal modeling. Of course, the use of good or bad methodol
ogy in a given experiment is not sufficient for making general statements
about whether animal modeling should be abolished overall.
2.
The history of medical science has not been as dependent on animal model
ing as we have been led to believe, and, therefore, animal modeling should
be abolished This argument is invalid. Whether or not the current state
of modem medical science was dependent on researchers having used
animal models in the past has no bearing on whether the continued use
of non-human animals is vital. Decisions about any future use of animal
models should be based on modem scientific knowledge about whether
animal models have predictive value for human outcomes, taking into ac
count information that may not have been available or considered when
past decisions were made.
3.
Review articles conclude that specific non-human animal species have not
been vital to various medical developments, and, thus, animal modeling
should be abolished This argument is not valid. Even if it were true that
Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
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specific non-human animal species were not essential parts of specific
medical advancements, this would not be a sound basis for evaluating
whether the overall use of animal models has predictive value for human
outcomes.
There are now alternatives to using non-human animals, and, therefore, an
4.
imal modeling should be abolished. There exist alternatives to many uses
of non-human animals in science but not others. Currently, for example,
there are no toxicity tests that have high enough predictive value for hu
mans. Nor can we ethically instrument the human brain the way we do
in non-human animals. The position in this point is further weakened by
the fact that it does not address whether animal modeling is scientifically
viable in the first place, nor does it offer a scientific theory to tie together
areas where animal use is successful and areas where it is not.
5.
The paradigm of animal modeling is not scientifically viablefor predicting
human response to drugs and diseases, and, thus, animal models should
not be used to predict human response to drugs and diseases. In contrast to
the previous four points, this particular point is based on critical think
ing, logic, and scientific facts; and, hence, it is a valid scientific argument.
Scientific knowledge from complexity science and evolutionary biology,
supported by empirical evidence, establishes that animal modeling does
not have predictive value for human outcomes. Past research in these
areas was summarized by authors, including Greek and Rice (2012), La
Follette and Shanks (1996), Lafollette and Shanks (1998), and Shanks
and Greek (2009), forming the basis for trans-species modeling theory
(TSMT): "While trans-species extrapolation is possible when perturba
tions concern lower levels of organization or when studying morphology
and function on the gross level, one evolved, complex system will not
be of predictive value for another when the perturbation affects higher
levels of organization" (Greek and Hansen, 2013a, p. 245).
In Chapter 17 in this volume, Greek and Kramer (2019) discuss TSMT in great
depth. Briefly, TSMT draws on established knowledge in evolutionary biolo
gy and complex systems science to draw the conclusion that animal models
cannot be predictive of human response to drugs and disease. We refer the
interested reader to Chapter 17 for further details. TSMT is the only scientific
argument that invalidates using animal models to predict human response to
perturbations that occur at higher levels of organization. TSMT is also the only
critique of animal modeling that both explains past apparent successes and
failures and why future reliance on animal models will lead to continued sig
nificant failures in predicting human responses (Greek, 2014; Greek and Han
sen, 2013a,b; Greek and Menache, 2013; Greek and Rice, 2012;Jones and Greek,
2013). Unlike TSMT, points 1-4 above do not offer any definitive resolution to
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the animal modeling controversy; indeed, many animal modeling advocates
agree with various aspects of these points. Furthermore, points 1-4 offer no
scientific evaluation of the problem, nor do they make reference to science to
support their assertions. Point 5, in contrast, is based on valid scientific foun
dations, and, hence, we focus here on TSMT as the only viable opposition to
the paradigm of animal modeling.
TSMT is a theory and, like all scientific theories, it is consistent with the
following definition from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine (2017): "In everyday usage, "theory" often refers to a hunch or
a speculation. When people say, "I have a theory about why that happened,"
they are often drawing a conclusion based on fragmentary or inconclusive
evidence. The formal scientific definition of theory is quite different from the
everyday meaning of the word. It refers to a comprehensive explanation of
some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence". Stated
differently, fact-supported theories should not be guesses but, instead, must
be reliable accounts of the real world. To that end, the facts associated with
evolution and complex systems have been established beyond doubt by obser
vation and experiments. Furthermore, there is extensive empirical evidence
from animal modeling to support TSMT. Additionally, TSMT is characterized
by consilience-it agrees with facts from other fields. It is also falsifiable and
generalizable, and it offers predictions for future outcomes. TSMT fulfills all of
the qualifications for a scientific theory.
In this chapter, we suggest a peer-reviewed debate process by which scien
tists and society, in general, could formally evaluate the scientific validity of
the statement in point 5 and, in so doing, could resolve the deep disagreement
about the predictive value of animal modeling. This process could have been
applied in the past and lethal errors would consequently have been avoided.
It could also be applied to other science-based controversies facing society.
The peer-reviewed debate we recommend is not a panacea appropriate for
all disagreements. Many disputes in life (and even those relating to the use of
non-human animals in certain contexts) do not center on science but rather
arise due to fundamental differences in opinion, which are rooted in ideology.
However, the process we propose is appropriate for settling controversies re
lated to science, such as those that arise in the context of using animal models
as predictors of human outcomes.

3

Why Science Is Important

The use of non-human animals in science and science education is not con
fined to biomedical research and testing where predictive value is touted as an
Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
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Nine categories of animal use in science and research (Greek and Shanks, 2009)
Non-human animals are used as predictive models of humans for research
into such diseases as cancer and AID S.

2.

Non-human animals are used as predictive models of humans for testing
drugs or other chemicals.

3.

Non-human animals are used as "spare parts", such as when a person

4.

Non-human animals are used as bioreactors or factories, such as for the

receives an aortic valve from a pig.
production of insulin or monoclonal antibodies or to maintain the supply
of a virus.

5.

Non-human animals and animal tissues are used to study basic physiologi

6.

Non-human animals are used in education to educate and train medical

cal principles.
students and to teach basic principles of anatomy in high school biology
classes.

7.

Non-human animals are used as a modality for ideas or as a heuristic

8.

Non-human animals are used in research designed to benefit other ani

device, which is a component of basic science research.
mals of the same species or breed.

9.

Non-human animals are used in research in order to gain knowledge for
knowledge sake.

objective. There are, in fact, many categories of animal use, as shown in Table 2.11
some of which do not lean on predictive value as a determining factor for using
non-human animals.
In general, it may be possible to justify the use of non-human animals as
sociated with Categories 3-9 based on scientific grounds, without reliance
on predictive value for perturbations that occur at higher levels of organiza
tion. For instance, one can make a logical argument, with valid reference to
science, to support the claim that human lives may be saved by using tissue
retrieved from an animal (Category 3) or to make the claim that one can learn
about the broad structure of lungs in mammals by examining the lungs of rats
(Category 6). (This does not rule out the possibility that, in some cases, there
may also be valid scientific objections; for example, the risk of facilitating the
cross-species transmission of viruses.) Furthermore, there may exist valid
ethical objections to the use of non-human animals in specific instances of
Categories 3-9. We leave aside possible objections such as these for the pur
poses of this discussion and focus, instead, exclusively on scientific arguments
Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
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regarding utility. Likewise, using some non-human animals in order to learn
more about other animals of the same species is scientifically uncontroversial
in veterinary medical research. However, it is not scientifically justifiable to use
non-human animals in the context of Categories 1 and 2, for reasons based in
complex systems science and evolutionary biology (for more details on com
plex systems science and evolutionary biology, see Chapter 17, the above-cited
papers regarding TSMT, and the references therein).
Nevertheless, the literature is filled with cases where researchers make
(baseless) claims that animal models have predictive value for human out
comes in the context of drugs and diseases. For example, the widely-used
Handbook of Laboratory Animal Science states: " [An] important group of ani
mal models is employed as predictive models. These models are used with the
aim of discovering and quantifying the impact of a treatment, whether this
is to cure a disease or to assess toxicity of a chemical compound" (Hau, 2003,
p. 2). A highly cited article in Clinical Cancer Research states: "GEMS [geneti
cally engineered mice] closely recapitulate the human disease and are used
to predict human response to a therapy, treatment or radiation schedule [ ... ]
GEMS that faithfully recapitulate human brain tumors and will likely result in
high-quality clinical trials with satisfactory treatment outcomes and reduced
drug toxicities" (Fomchenko and Holland, 2006, p. 5296). The popular text
book, Animal Models in Toxicology (Gad, 2007), states: "Biomedical sciences'
use of animals as models [is to] help understand and predict responses in
humans, in toxicology, and pharmacology [ ... ] [B] y and large animals have
worked exceptionally well as predictive models for humans" (Preface). "Ani
mals have been used as models for centuries to predict what chemicals and
environmental factors would do to humans [ ... ] The use of animals as predic
tors of potential ill effects has grown since that time" (p. 2). "If we correct
ly identify toxic agents (using animals and other predictive model systems)
in advance of a product or agent being introduced into the marketplace or
environment, generally it will not be introduced" (p. 3). These are but a few
of the many instances where researchers make vastly over-reaching claims
about the prediction value of animal models. A balanced assessment of
the overall evidence shows, instead, that animal models, for all practical
purposes, do not have predictive value for human responses to drugs and
diseases.
Further to that point, the medical literature contains many papers that
show, based on the (standard) statistical concept of predictive value, that there
is no basis to continue using non-human animals to predict human response
to drugs and diseases (Greek, 2014; Greek and Greek, 2010; Greek and Hansen,
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2013a; Greek, Pippus and Hansen, 2012b; Greek and Rice, 2012; Greek, Shanks
and Rice, 2011b; Shanks and Greek, 2009; Shanks, Greek and Greek, 2009). Since
advocates of animal modeling appeal to the predictive value argument tojus
tify their use of non-human animals, the onus is on those advocates to clearly
establish predictive value. Yet, such evidence based on predictive value, which
may support of the use of animal models, is notably absent from the scientific
literature. That evidence is also absent from the legally binding documents that
the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees and funding bodies, such
as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the us, require animal modelers
to sign, testifying that their projects have a reasonable expectation to translate
to humans. The lack of evidence is a direct consequence of the fact (shown by
the studies cited above, and, in tum, the many studies they cite) that responses
to perturbations, such as drugs and diseases, in an animal have effectively no
predictive value for responses in humans.
The fact that animal models do not have predictive value for human re
sponses has several important implications, including the following:
1.
The extent to which the general public supports the use of non-human
animals in research rests on an assumption that the outcome of the re
search benefits humans directly. For example, writing in Nature, Giles
states: "public opinion is behind animal research only if it helps develop
better drugs." (2006, p. 981) Since animal models do not have predictive
value for human outcomes, their use should be abandoned.
Continuing to use non-human animals in the absence of predictive value
2.
wastes time and money (see Chapter 10) which could instead be devoted
to scientifically valid pursuits.
Various members of the pharmaceutical industry and various scientists
3.
have acknowledged the failure of the animal model for predicting hu
man responses to drugs and diseases (Arrowsmith, 2011a,b; Ennever,
Noonan and Rosenkranz, 1987; Fletcher, 1978; Food and Drug Adminis
tration, 2004; Johnson et al., 2001; Kola and Landis, 2004; Kummar et al.,
2007; Lumley, 1990; Morgan et al., 2012; Seok et al., 2013; van Meer et al.,
2012). Nevertheless, there is a widespread belief among lawmakers and
members of the public that animal models cannot be abandoned until
"alternatives" have been developed. The logic behind this belief is spe
cious. To demonstrate this, we offer the following thought experiment.
Imagine if regulators were to choose which drugs to endorse for human
use based on a simple coin flip (e.g., heads, we allow humans to use a
given drug; tails, we do not). Such an approach would do nothing to en
sure the safety or efficacy of drugs reaching the market. This is because
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coin flips do not have predictive value for determining human responses
to drugs. Consequently, it would make no sense to continue using coin
flips to choose drugs until an alternative to coin flips could be identified.
Likewise, animal models do not have predictive value in determining hu
man responses to drugs, and their use must be halted independent of
whether an alternative exists.
Animal-based research lacks predictive value for human responses to
4.
drugs and diseases, and, thus, it is reckless to continue to justify the use
of animal models with myths about protecting humans in clinical trials
or learning about human disease. Abundant theoretical and empirical
evidence has established unequivocally that the animal model does not
have predictive value for humans and indeed cannot. Thus, the only sci
entifically valid conclusion is to stop attempting to use animal models
to predict outcomes for humans. See Kramer and Greek (2018) for an
extensive discussion of the many ways various groups of human stake
holders, including but not limited to patients, are directly harmed by the
continued use of animal models.
While the vested interests we described earlier have served as an obstacle to
acceptance of the fact that animal models do not have predictive value for
human responses, the truth has, nevertheless, been acknowledged in the sci
entific literature, on occasion. For example, Markou, Chiamulera, Geyer, Trick
lebank (of Eli Lilly) and Steckler (ofJohnson andJohnson) state: "Despite great
advances in basic neuroscience knowledge, the improved understanding of
brain functioning has not yet led to the introduction of truly novel pharmaco
logical approaches to the treatment of central nervous system (CNS) disorders.
This situation has been partly attributed to the difficulty of predicting efficacy
in patients based on results from preclinical studies [mainly animal studies,
although in vitro would also be included in preclinical studies] [ . . . ] Few would
dispute the need to move away from the concept of modeling CNS diseases in
their entirety using animals" (Markou et al., 2009, p. 74). Additional examples
include: Alini et al. (2008); Arrowsmith (2011a, b); Begley (2003a, b); Butler
(2008); Contopoulos-Ioannidis, Ntzani and Ioannidis (2003); Crowley (2003);
Dragunow (2008); Editorial (2010, 2012); Ferdowsian and Beck (2011); Geerts
(2009); Grant, Green and Mason (2003); Hackam and Redelmeier (2006);
Hampton (2006); Hoerig and Pullman (2004); Holmes, Solari and Holgate
(2011); Hurko and Ryan (2005); Ioannidis (2004);Jin and Wang (2003);Johnston
(2006); Kaste (2005); Langley (2014); Ledford (20081 2012); Leslie (2010); Lieb
man (2005); Lindi, Voelkel and Kolar (2005); Mankoff et al. (2004); Marincola
(2003); Markou et al. (2009); Mullane and Williams (2012); Pammolli, Magazzi
ni and Riccaboni (2011); Philips (2004); Pound et al. (2004); Pound and Bracken
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(2014); Reynolds (2012); Rosenberg (2003); Rothwell (2006); Sena et al. (2007);
Smith (1987); van der Worp et al. (2010); Xiong, Mahmood and Chopp (2013);
and Zerhouni (2005).
Further evidence that animal models are extremely limited in what they
can inform, regarding druggable targets and future cures, comes from a com
ment in the AmericanJournal of Medicine about Contopoulos-Ioannidis et al.'s
(2003) article:
The article by Contopoulos-Ioannidis et al. in this issue of the Journal
addresses a much-discussed but rarely quantified issue: the frequency
with which basic research findings translate into clinical utility. The au
thors performed an algorithmic computer search of all articles published
in six leading basic science journals (Nature, Cell, Science, theJournal of
Biological Chemistry, the Journal of Clinical Investigation, the Journal Ex
perimental Medicine) from 1979 to 1983. Of the 25,000 articles searched,
about 500 (2%) contained some potential claim to future applicability
in humans, about 100 (0.4%) resulted in a clinical trial, and, according to
the authors, only 1 (0.004°/o) led to the development of a clinically useful
class of drugs (angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors) in the 30 years
following their publication of the basic science finding. They also found
that the presence of industrial support increased the likelihood of trans
lating a basic finding into a clinical trial by eightfold. [ ... ] Still, regardless
of the study's limitations, and even if the authors were to underestimate
the frequency of successful translation into clinical use by 10-fold, their
findings strongly suggest that, as most observers suspected, the transfer
rate of basic research into clinical use is very low.
CROWL EY, 2003, p. 503

Note that of the 101 articles that formed the primary focus of Crowley's study,
about 64% were animal studies. An Editorial (2010, p. 499) in Nature supports
the above position:
The readers of Nature should be an optimistic bunch. Every week we
publish encouraging dispatches from the continuing war against disease
and ill health. Genetic pathways are unravelled, promising drug targets
are identified and sickly animal models are brought back to rude health.
Yet the number of human diseases that can be efficiently treated remains
low-a concerning impotency given the looming health burden of the
developed world's ageing population. The uncomfortable truth is that sci
entists and clinicians have been unable to convert basic biology advances
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into therapies or resolve why these conversion attempts so often don't
succeed. Together, these failures are hampering clinical research at a time
when it should be expanding.
Given the vast amount of money that funds animal-based research and test
ing, the many hours of human effort that are devoted to these pursuits, and
the reliance of all humans whose well-being relies on scientific knowledge for
maintaining health and treating disease, there is an urgent need for unbiased,
expert scientists to assess the predictive value of animal models. We propose
a debate for this purpose, and we now turn to outlining the parameters for
ensuring such a debate is sound.

4

How to Evaluate Scientific Arguments

Science is a process of observing the material universe, possibly conducting
experiments related to those observations, and ultimately ascertaining facts.
According to E.O. Wilson (1999, p. 58): "Science [ ... ] is the organized, systematic
enterprise that gathers knowledge about the world and condenses the knowledge
into testable Laws and principles." Often, time will determine whether a given
scientist's conclusions are representative of the material universe. But in the
interim, the best method for separating fact from fiction involves the peer
review process. The peer-review process uses experts in specific areas of sci
ence to evaluate the work of others and to determine whether the research and
conclusions of that research are reliable enough to be published in a science
journal for dissemination to a broad readership.
The peer-review process of scientific journals works as follows. A number of
experts are asked to review a submission to the journal and determine (among
other factors):
- whether the submission is in accordance with known facts about our current scientific understanding
- whether the terms and assumptions are consistent with proper usage
- whether the methodology is appropriate
- whether the statistics were correctly calculated
- whether or not there are flaws in the authors' reasoning
- whether the findings are likely to be of interest to the scientific community,
policy makers, and/or the general public.
This process is not foolproof, but under the appropriate circumstances, it is
usually capable of separating potential facts from sheer nonsense. Depend
ing on the contents of the submission, experts from several different areas
of science may be asked to review the submission and judge the part of the
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submission that falls under his or her area of expertise. We propose that some
thing akin to this peer-review process should be employed in order to evaluate
the scientific viability of using one species to predict response for another in
the context of developing drugs and treating diseases.
The peer-review process has been used repeatedly to resolve disputes in
many scientific settings, for instance at conferences where select scholars pre
sented evidence for and against a particular position in front of an audience of
other experts in the field. A consensus is sought, if not in terms of who is right,
at least in terms of which statements can be taken as fact and which must still
be taken as conjecture. However, many controversies in science have, instead,
been left to simply play out on their own without interference in the form of
peer review. Some of these events have had lethal consequences. For example,
in 1847, Ignaz Semmelweis introduced the idea that the unwashed hands of
medical students and physicians spread the disease known as puerperal fever,
an infection related to child bearing. Despite the fact that his patients dem
onstrated a reduced mortality rate after he and his students began washing
their hands, his colleagues ostracized him, and his idea died along with many
more patients. Had experts been convened to study and debate the evidence,
antiseptic techniques would have been developed much sooner and many
mothers' lives would have been saved (Ataman, Vatanoglu-Lutz, and Yildmm,
2013 ) . Other prominent examples of scientific breakthroughs being ignored in
clude the following: Barbara McClintock's idea of jumping genes, transposons,
was ignored by a mostly male establishment in biology. McClintock could not
even find a publisher for her research. Darwin's theory of evolution was almost
forgotten in the early twentieth century. Alfred Wegener's idea of continental
drift was ignored because he did not propose a mechanism for the notion.
Science has also allowed nonsense to go unchallenged until someone pub
licly proved the status quo wrong or, occasionally, until disaster occurred. Some
cases persisted simply because no one exhibited the courage to disrupt the sta
tus quo; unfortunately, history is full of such examples. The Columbia disaster
of 2003 occurred because the craft was allowed to launch despite engineers
knowing there were problems with the tiles (Langewiesche, 2003) . Similarly,
the space shuttle Challenger disaster of 1986 was caused by engineers ignor
ing a problem with the 0-rings. Descartes' unsubstantiated assertions con
vinced society that non-human animals were not sentient, and some members
of society are still clinging to that position. Smoking was defended by some
physicians for years because they were employed by the tobacco industry
(Jackler, 2015). Scientific consensus can also be wrong. For instance, Earth con
traction theory was wrong and was eventually replaced by Wegener's move
ment of continents and eventually plate tectonics. Newton was shown to be
partially wrong by Einstein's theory of relativity. Some of Einstein's objections
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to quantum mechanics turned out to be wrong. The notion that ulcers were
relieved by decreasing anxiety and drinking milk was abandoned after Mar
shall proved that ulcers were the result of an infectious disease, and research
revealed that milk actually stimulated acid production in the stomach. Peer
review, debate, and the convening of experts at conferences, all played a role
in ensuring that obsolete scientific views were replaced by positions rooted in
modem knowledge.
Science has historically advanced slowly and by consensus, which is why
Planck (1949, pp. 33-34) stated: "A new scientific truth does not triumph by
convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its
opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with
it." Reaching consensus slowly and methodically can have its advantages in cer
tain contexts; but when lives are at stake, as was the case with Semmelweis and
is the case with using animal models to predict human outcomes, a slow pace is
not acceptable. The debate we propose can help expedite the formal evaluation
of conflicting views and is especially appropriate for facilitating discussions
about complex topics with foundations that span multiple disciplines.

5

Peer-reviewed Debate

We propose to borrow elements of the process used in peer-reviewed science
journals and implement them in a debate format to evaluate the scientific is
sues surrounding the use of animal models, specifically, to resolve whether
non-human animals have a high predictive value in terms of modeling human
response to drugs and diseases. The scientific literature contains an abundance
of articles that ought to convince a scientifically-minded reader that animal
models do not have predictive value for human response to drugs and diseas
es; a small sampling includes, Arrowsmith (2011a, b); Crowley (2003); Greek
(2012, 2016); Greek and Greek (2010); Greek and Hansen (2012, 2013a); Greek,
Hansen and Menache (2011a); Greek and Menache (2013); Greek, Menache and
Rice (2012b); Greek and Rice (2012); Greek, Shanks and Rice (2011b); Hurko and
Ryan (2005); Jones and Greek (2013); Marincola (2003); Mullane and Williams
(2012); Shanks and Greek (2008, 2009); and Shanks, Greek and Greek (2009).
We propose the debate as a supplement to the existing literature, not only to
help promote scientific consensus but also to reach a much broader audience
of interested parties, including members of the general public.
A formal debate, sponsored by a government or major science organiza
tion and with implications for future funding and legislation, would compel
the animal model community to participate and address the problems with
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animal modeling. Engaging in less formal debates, including traditional oral
debates organized by university departments or student groups (as we have
done frequently; see Sandgren and Greek, 2007; Skolnick and Greek, 2005), has
far less scope for effecting a change in consensus views about animal modeling.
The reasons for this are many, including the fact that layperson members of the
audience typically do not understand the science (and there are typically no
expert judges present to help the audience evaluate the debaters' positions); if
there are judges present, their expertise may not span all the areas of science
that are pertinent to a full and careful evaluation of animal modeling; and time
and format constraints prevent the debaters from going into sufficient detail to
substantiate their cases. We propose a formal debate that would address these
issues, permitting a fair evaluation of both sides of the debate. We recommend
the following rules for the debate:
1.
The subject of the debate will be the position that animal models have
insufficient predictive value for human response to perturbations that
occur at higher levels of organization (e.g., human response to drugs
and diseases) and the implication that the vast majority of animal use
in science, in general, and research and testing, in particular, should
cease.
2.
Each side of the debate will be represented by a single individual who
is recognized as an expert by the public and the scientific community.
That individual may, in tum, consult any number of experts for input and
guidance.
A single person or a group of not more than three people will be appoint
3.
ed as moderator( s) of the debate.
A panel of scientists who are experts in the relevant fields will act as
4.
judges and will evaluate the positions put forward by the debaters. These
panel members may come from academia or industry and must be recog
nized as experts by the public and the scientific community. In all, 12-20
scientists will be selected to serve on the expert panel, and their collec
tive expertise will span and encompasses the following fields:
a. clinical medicine, in general, as well as infectious diseases, cancer,
heart diseases, and neurology
b. statistics
c. evolutionary biology, including evolutionary and developmental
biology
d. clinical research
e. drug development
£ personalized medicine
g. basic research
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h. complexity theory (expert(s) should come from the math or physics
department of a university)
i. critical thinking, the history of the science behind medical discover
ies, and philosophy of science, in general (expert(s) should have ex
tensive training and credentials in science as well as the stated areas).
The judges and moderator(s) must have no vested interests in the out
come of the debate, including any of the following:
a. a direct financial interest in the outcome of the debate, such as cur
rently receiving money for conducting or facilitating animal-based
research
b. a significant indirect financial interest that arises from animal-based
research or testing
c. an indirect vested interest, such as having, at least in-part, made one's
reputation through having conducted research using non-human
animals
d. an indirect financial interest in the form of having a first-degree rela
tive or spouse who currently receives or formerly received funding for
animal-based research or testing
e. a philosophical or emotional interest in the use of non-human animals
in research and testing, such as well-known figures from the animal
protection movement or pro-vivisection/pro animal-use movement.
The debate itself will consist of the following steps:
a. The debaters, panel members, and moderators will agree on a set
of panel members, textbooks, or position papers that specify basic
principles of science and critical thinking. Any disagreements will be
settled by the expert in the relevant area prior to the proceeding with
next steps and will be disclosed by the moderator( s) in the last step
of the debate. This will encourage all parties to play fairly, as the com
munications will be a matter of record.
b. Each of the debaters will submit a written position paper.
c. If the judges have questions or comments about the position pa
pers, they will compile them and submit them to the appropriate
debater(s ).
d. Each debater will have the option to respond in writing to the set of
judges' questions/comments.
e. The judges will render their judgement after evaluating the position
papers and (if appropriate) responses. The judges' evaluations must
be based on the validity of each side's position, as stated in the posi
tion paper and responses to questions, and each side's adherence to
the rules of engagement. In evaluating this set of information, each
judge must verify (based on their respective area of expertise) whether
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the provided evidence supports the debaters' claims and whether
the arguments and reasoning in the position papers are sound and
valid.
£ The judges will compile a list of claims made in each side's position
paper which were rejected by the judges as false or unsubstantiated,
as well as instances in each position paper which were deemed by the
judges to be inconsistent with the agreed-upon principles of critical
thinking and science. Advance knowledge that these disclosures will
occur, will encourage all parties to play fairly, because all of their state
ments will be a matter of record.
g. The full proceedings, including the names of all participants, the
position papers, the judges' questions and comments, the debater's
responses, the judges' final decision, and the disclosures described
above will all be published in a scholarly outlet, such as an open
access journal.

6

Conclusion

Science has evolved since the time when animal modelers first began using
non-human animals in earnest in the nineteenth century. But never have ex
perts convened to formally examine the evidence for and against the continued
use of non-human animals. The debate we propose for this purpose, conduct
ed in public and judged by unbiased experts, is long overdue. There is no argu
ment in modern society about whether scientists should receive funding to
develop a perpetual motion machine; this is because science has established
that such a device cannot exist. Analogously, society's continued investment
in animal modeling can and should be evaluated based on its scientific merit.
Given the fact that governments and businesses devote scarce resources and
vast sums of money to the enterprise of using animal models to predict human
responses to drugs and diseases, and the fact that human lives are at stake,
there is an urgent need to evaluate whether science supports the continua
tion of this practice. The debate we propose would serve as a significant step
forward to that end.
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